The recent militant assault in Pahalgam, within Indian-administered Kashmir, which claimed the lives of 26 civilians, has reopened old wounds and revived familiar concerns among India’s security and diplomatic establishments.
Such incidents echo a troubling pattern. In 2016, after 19 Indian soldiers were killed in an attack in Uri, India responded by carrying out “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control, targeting what it described as militant camps on the Pakistani side.
In 2019, a suicide bombing in Pulwama took the lives of 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, leading to Indian airstrikes in Balakot—deep inside Pakistani territory. This marked the first such offensive since 1971 and triggered retaliatory actions, including an aerial confrontation.
Even earlier, the devastating 2008 Mumbai attacks—a three-day siege targeting hotels, a railway station, and a Jewish centre—left 166 people dead and shocked the nation.
On each occasion, New Delhi has pointed fingers at militant groups based in Pakistan, accusing Islamabad of either supporting or turning a blind eye to their activities—an allegation that Pakistan has consistently denied.
Since 2016, and particularly after the 2019 airstrikes, the threshold for military escalation has noticeably shifted. Cross-border strikes and aerial attacks by India have become more frequent, often resulting in countermeasures by Pakistan and heightening tensions in an already fragile region.
Analysts suggest India is once again navigating a delicate path between measured retaliation and full-scale escalation—a balancing act between deterrence and diplomacy. One individual familiar with this recurring cycle is Ajay Bisaria, who served as India’s high commissioner to Pakistan during the Pulwama crisis. He later chronicled those turbulent events in his memoir, Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship between India and Pakistan.
“There are clear similarities between the aftermath of the Pulwama incident and the recent killings in Pahalgam,” said Mr. Bisaria during an interview conducted ten days after the latest attack.
However, he pointed out a significant difference. While Pulwama and Uri primarily targeted military personnel, the Pahalgam attack was aimed at civilians—specifically tourists from different parts of India—bringing back painful memories of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. “This incident contains aspects reminiscent of Pulwama, but it resembles Mumbai far more,” he observed.
“We find ourselves once again in a state of heightened conflict, and the pattern appears all too familiar,” Mr. Bisaria added.
In the days following the attack, the Indian government responded swiftly with a series of countermeasures. Authorities shut down a major border crossing, suspended a critical water-sharing agreement, expelled Pakistani diplomats, and restricted visa issuance for Pakistani citizens—many of whom were ordered to leave the country within days. Skirmishes involving small-arms fire have also broken out along the border.
Additionally, India banned all Pakistani aircraft—both civilian and military—from entering its airspace, in response to a similar ban earlier imposed by Pakistan. In turn, Pakistan implemented reciprocal visa suspensions and formally paused a peace treaty dating back to 1972. The long-standing dispute over Kashmir—a region both nations claim in full but control in parts—remains a central point of contention between the nuclear-armed neighbors, whose rivalry dates back to the 1947 partition.
In his memoir, Mr. Bisaria reflects on India’s swift and strategic reaction following the Pulwama attack on 14 February 2019.
He recalls being urgently called to Delhi the next morning, as the Indian government promptly revoked Pakistan’s “most-favoured-nation” trade status—an arrangement in place since 1996. Shortly after, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) imposed a 200% customs duty on Pakistani imports, effectively cutting off trade. Additionally, commercial exchanges through the Wagah land border were suspended.
According to Mr. Bisaria, the government also considered a wider range of actions aimed at scaling back diplomatic and cross-border engagement—most of which were eventually carried out.
These included halting the Samjhauta Express, a key rail link between the two nations, and a bus service connecting Delhi and Lahore. Scheduled meetings between border security officials were postponed, and talks concerning the Kartarpur corridor—an important pilgrimage route for Sikhs—were put on hold. Visa processing was stopped, cross-border travel was blocked, and flights between India and Pakistan were suspended.
Reflecting on these developments, Mr. Bisaria writes: “Building trust was painstaking and slow. Yet, dismantling it took only moments.”
He emphasized how years of diplomacy and confidence-building could be undone in an instant—”crossed out on a yellow notepad in minutes.”
India also reduced its diplomatic presence in Islamabad in stages, cutting the number of officials from 110 to 55 in June 2020 after a separate diplomatic dispute. Following the Pahalgam incident, that number was further reduced to just 30.
In the immediate aftermath of the Pulwama bombing, India launched a diplomatic campaign. Then foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale briefed representatives from 25 countries—including major powers such as the US, UK, China, Russia, and France—on the involvement of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Pakistan-based group that claimed responsibility for the attack. India also accused Pakistan of employing terrorism as an instrument of state policy. JeM is listed as a terrorist organization by India, the United Nations, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
India intensified its diplomatic campaign on 25 February, ten days after the Pulwama attack, by pressing for the United Nations sanctions committee to formally list Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief Masood Azhar as a designated terrorist. Simultaneously, New Delhi pushed for his inclusion on the European Union’s independent terrorist watchlist.
Although there was internal pressure to scrap the Indus Waters Treaty—a significant agreement governing water sharing between India and Pakistan—India chose instead to limit its cooperation strictly to the treaty’s terms, withholding any information beyond what was required. Mr. Bisaria notes that 48 bilateral agreements between the two nations were reassessed for potential suspension. Additionally, an all-party meeting held in Delhi concluded with a unanimous resolution condemning the attack.
Despite rising tensions, critical lines of communication remained active. The military hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) continued to function, allowing direct contact between armed forces. Diplomatic ties through both nations’ high commissions were also maintained. As in similar past incidents, Pakistan dismissed the attack as a “false-flag operation.”
On the ground in Kashmir, Indian authorities launched a clampdown similar to previous operations, arresting more than 80 individuals believed to be “overground workers”—locals suspected of aiding JeM militants with logistics, shelter, or intelligence. Then Home Minister Rajnath Singh visited Jammu and Kashmir, while intelligence dossiers outlining the attack and its suspected planners were compiled.
During a meeting with then External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, Mr. Bisaria expressed the view that India’s diplomatic toolkit for responding to terrorist attacks was limited. He recalls her implying that decisive action was imminent, after which diplomacy would take on a greater role.
That anticipated move came on 26 February, when India launched airstrikes across the international border for the first time since 1971, targeting a JeM training facility in Balakot.
Within six hours, India’s foreign secretary issued a statement claiming the airstrikes had eliminated a significant number of militants and senior operatives. Pakistan, however, promptly denied those assertions. The developments triggered another series of high-level strategy meetings in New Delhi.
The crisis intensified sharply on the morning of 27 February when Pakistan carried out retaliatory airstrikes in response to the Indian air raids.
During the resulting aerial confrontation, an Indian fighter aircraft was shot down, and the pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, was captured after ejecting and landing in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. His capture by Pakistani forces sparked a wave of anxiety and national concern across India, significantly raising the stakes in an already volatile standoff between two nuclear-armed states.
According to Mr. Bisaria, India swiftly activated several diplomatic channels, with the United States and the United Kingdom engaging Islamabad to defuse the situation. New Delhi’s message was unequivocal: any harm to the captured pilot or further escalation would provoke a strong Indian response.
On 28 February, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced that the pilot would be released, framing the decision as a gesture of goodwill to ease rising tensions. Wing Commander Abhinandan was handed back to Indian authorities on 1 March under the protocols typically followed for prisoners of war.
By 5 March, following the Pulwama bombing, the Balakot airstrikes, and the return of the pilot, tensions had begun to ease. The Indian government, signaling a pivot toward diplomacy, decided to reinstate its high commissioner to Pakistan.
“I returned to Islamabad on 10 March, 22 days after departing in the immediate aftermath of the Pulwama attack,” Mr. Bisaria recounts. “What had been the most serious military escalation since Kargil had effectively concluded within a month.”
He reflects that both nations emerged with their narratives—India having met its strategic and military goals, and Pakistan presenting the pilot’s release as a diplomatic win for domestic consumption—while still leaving room for traditional diplomacy to resume.
Mr. Bisaria described the situation as both “challenging and deeply engaging” from a diplomatic perspective. What sets the current crisis apart, he points out, is that the victims were Indian civilians rather than security personnel, and the attack took place at a time when conditions in Kashmir had notably improved—an irony that underscores the shock of the incident.
He believes that some level of escalation is almost unavoidable in such circumstances, but also notes a parallel desire within the government to avoid uncontrolled escalation. During meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), he explains, there is a conscious effort to assess the broader economic implications of any retaliatory action and to choose responses that penalize Pakistan without causing significant fallout for India.
“The tone and visuals resemble previous crises,” he observes, but adds that the most consequential development could be India’s warning to reconsider the Indus Waters Treaty. “Should India follow through, it would have profound and lasting repercussions for Pakistan,” he emphasizes.
Mr. Bisaria also reminds that the situation remains fluid: “We’re still navigating an active crisis. No military action has taken place—at least, not yet.”
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